The ability to recall information about the past is thought to emerge in the 2nd half of the 1st year of life. Although there is evidence from both cognitive neuroscience and behavioral psychology to support this hypothesis, there is little longitudinal evidence with which the question can be addressed. Infants' memory abilities were tested between the ages of 9 and 16 months using elicited and deferred imitation. Infants' memory for events was tested after delays ranging from 1 to 6 months. The results suggest that at 9 months of age, infants are able to store and retrieve representations over delays of as many as 4 weeks but not over long delays. In contrast, 10-month-olds have at their disposal a system that allows encoding and retrieval of event representations over delays of up to 6 months. These results support the idea that the system that underlies long-term ordered recall emerges near the end of the 1st year of life.
Memory for the past is fundamental to cognitive function. It is taken virtually for granted by most adults. Developmental changes in this important function have historically been thought to occur only after the end of the infancy period with the emergence of symbolic representational abilities (Piaget, 1951 (Piaget, , 1952 . Of particular significance is development of the capacity for recall, or the process of "accessing (bringing to awareness) a cognitive structure pertaining to a past experience not currently available to perception" (Mandler, 1984, p. 79) . Developments in the ability to invoke past experiences have implications for a range of functions both within and beyond the traditional confines of cognition. For example, the emergence of the separation anxiety that is a typical indication of an infant's attachment to a caregiver may be related to the infant's ability to maintain a representation of the caregiver in the caregiver's absence. Recall in general permits access to previous experience; long-term recall in particular permits the organism to construct an enduring record of the past. In this article, we develop the argument that the neural structures that are involved in different aspects of recall memory mature at different rates. In particular, we argue that the components of the substrate that are involved in long-term memory (in contrast to short-term or immediate memory) for temporal information come on-line during the last half of the 1 st year of postnatal life. We present behavioral data from infants tested between the ages of 9 and 16 months that suggest that this age range is an important period of change in the development of long-term mnemonic ability.
Recall memory falls under the rubric of explicit or declarative memory, which is a specific form of memory subserved by a particular neural system. With the discovery that patients with damage to the medial temporal lobe do poorly on some memory tasks but not on others, the distinction between explicit memory and other forms of memory (e.g., implicit or procedural) has become fairly well accepted in the adult literature (but see Roediger, Rajaram, & Srinivas, 1990 , for an alternative view). In a recent study (Knowlton, Mangels, & Squire, 1996) , adults with amnesia were impaired in explicitly remembering training sessions in which they had learned probabilistic relations between abstract figures and outcomes. Nevertheless, the patients performed better on the task over time, making accurate predictions of outcomes based on probabilities related to combinations of abstract stimuli presented. A group of patients with Parkinson's disease, which affects neostriatal areas, were impaired in the nonexplicit probabilistic association but remembered the training sessions well. This double dissociation suggests that different memory systems underlie the two tasks and that different neural systems are involved in each type of memory. The finding thus complements previous descriptions of a similar dissociation between explicit and nonexplicit memory ability in patients with amnesia (e.g., Squire, 1992) .
Traditionally, explicit memory has been defined by involvement of the medial temporal lobe (Squire, 1992; Squire & Zola-Morgan, 1991) . More recent evidence, however, suggests that the formation, maintenance, and subsequent retrieval of explicit memory representations over the long term depends on a more complex system involving neural structures in addition to those in the medial temporal lobe. Specifically, whereas medial temporal lobe structures are involved in the initial storage and consolidation of memories, prefrontal cortex is implicated in retrieval of memories over long delays. Consistent with these suggestions, patients with damage confined to medial temporal structures have impairments in storing new information, but their long-term retrieval mecha-nisms are relatively intact. In contrast, adult patients with prefrontal damage have impairments that seem specific to retrieval of information in long-term storage (Markowitsch, 1995; .
Although the story is still unfolding, the best available evidence suggests that the substrate supporting long-term explicit memory and, thereby, long-term recall includes the medial temporal lobe, the medial diencephalon, and the prefrontal cortex. In 1984, Schacter and Moscovitch suggested that the period between 8 and 12 months is a watershed interval in the development of this system. A decade later, the suggestion was further developed by Nelson (1995 Nelson ( , 1997 . Summarizing evidence of neuroanatomical and neurophysiological developments, Nelson suggested that, in the first 6 months of life, medial temporal lobe structures are sufficiently functionally mature to support the initial storage and consolidation of memories and, thereby, to permit the performance of explicit memory tasks over the short term. In contrast, the balance of the cortico-limbic-diencephalic circuit, including the prefrontal cortex, begins to coalesce only in the second half of the 1st year, with continued development through the 2nd year and beyond. Among the implications of this analysis is the possibility that infants will be adept at tasks requiring long-term storage and retrieval only after the entire explicit memory circuit begins to be connected (Carver & Bauer, 1999) . Thus, whereas we can expect to see explicit memory over the short term in infants in the first half of the 1st year of life, it is only during the last several months of the 1 st year that we would expect to see evidence of long-term recall. Moreover, because of implications of involvement of prefrontal structures in recall of temporal order information (e.g., Fuster, 1985; Jetter, Poser, Freeman, & Markowitsch, 1986; Squire, 1982) , developments in ordered recall ability also would be expected during the last several months of the 1st year. After reviewing data on the neural substrate of long-term explicit memory and its development, we review behavioral data relevant to this proposed time frame. Together, the literatures motivate further research on long-term recall memory during the second half of the 1st year of life. We present the results of four experiments on long-term recall in this age range.
The Neurological Foundation of Explicit Memory and Its Development
The medial temporal lobe, including the hippocampus, the amygdala, and the surrounding cortices, are thought to be involved in the processes of encoding and consolidating explicit memories. Studies of patients with circumscribed temporal lobe lesions have shown that the medial temporal lobe is important for acquisition of new memories (Squire, 1992; Squire & Zola-Morgan, 1991) . For example, Zola-Morgan, Squire, and Amaral (1986) documented impaired formation of new explicit memories in a patient (R.B.) with damage restricted to the CA1 region of the hippocampus. The observation that in many patients with medial temporal lobe damage retrograde memory (i.e., memory for events from before the injury occurred) is impaired in a time-dependent fashion (Squire, 1986) , with memory for more recent experiences impaired but memory for earlier experiences largely intact, has led to the suggestion that the role of the medial temporal lobes in the preservation of memories is time limited (Squire, 1992) . After a period of initial organization and consolidation, memories once supported by the medial temporal structures are distributed to cortical association areas. Whereas the initial encoding and consolidation of visual memories is dependent on medial temporal structures, the presumed long-term storage sites for visual memories are the visual association areas (i.e., in the monkey, area TE; Squire, 1986) . Distributed networks comprising components throughout cortical association areas and the medial temporal lobes are the most likely candidates for the form of these representations (Bear, 1996) . The mechanism for storage in these networks is thought to be synaptic plasticity in the medial temporal lobe and cortex (Bailey, Bartsch, & Kandel, 1996; Bear, 1996) . It is not clear, however, what developmental changes allow for the formation of these networks.
There is both behavioral and neurophysiological evidence that prefrontal and anterior temporal cortices play a role in the retrieval of memories from long-term stores. described a case of mild retrograde amnesia in a patient with right prefrontal and bilateral temporal pole damage. Lesions of the prefrontal cortex have been shown to impair recall of word lists (Jetter et al., 1986) . In addition, positron-emission tomography (PET) studies have shown that when participants are retrieving memories of previously learned word pairs, blood flow increases in the right prefrontal cortex (Cabeza et al., 1997) . The increases were observed in both recall and recognition paradigms. Likewise, recall of previously learned words is associated with increased blood flow in the anterior right prefrontal cortex. In contrast, PET scanning revealed no increase in prefrontal blood flow in an analogous priming condition (Buckner et al., 1995) . In a review of the literature on episodic memory, Wheeler, Stuss, and Tulving (1997) concluded that the prefrontal cortex allows the individual to consciously access representations of past events. With respect to the specific role of the components of the circuit, Markowitsch (1995) suggested that prefrontal and temporal pole areas are not involved in the storage of memories per se. Rather, connections between these areas and association cortices thought to be sites of memory storage allow retrieval of memory traces. Prefrontal cortex also is implicated in memory for temporal order. For example, patients who are not amnesic but who have frontal damage exhibit difficulties remembering when they encounter material for the first time (Janowsky, Shimamura, & Squire, 1989) . Frontal lobe pathology also is associated with difficulties making judgments about relative temporal order (e.g., Milner, 1971; Squire, 1982) .
Because long-term memory and memory for temporal order are dependent on a distributed neural system, storage and subsequent retrieval of memories over long delays depends on the integrity of the structures themselves as well as of the pathways between them. What is known about the time course of development of the relevant neural substrate? Anatomical evidence suggests that with some exceptions (e.g., dentate gyrus; Nelson, 1997) medial temporal lobe structures mature fairly early. PET studies of glucose utilization show elevated levels in temporal cortex by 3 months of age, followed by a gradual decrease to adult levels (Chugani, Phelps, & Mazziotta, 1986) . This rise and fall in glucose utilization corresponds to synapse overproduction and later pruning that has also been observed in studies of the development of synapse formation (Huttenlocher, 1990) . Although it is unclear exactly what elevated levels of glucose utilization mean, it has been noted that periods of high levels of glucose utilization coincide with periods of change in the behaviors subserved by the region where the elevated glucose is observed (Chugani et al., 1986) . It may be that the increase in glucose utilization is related to the acquisition of new abilities. In addition, regressive events may also be involved in the development of adult-level functioning. For example, adult levels of functioning on some tasks coincide temporally with the decrease to adult levels of glucose utilization (Chugani et al., 1986) .
Although there are relatively few available data on the development of the medial diencephalon, on a gross level, it appears that the thalamus matures quite early. Infants who develop symmetrical thalamic lesions exhibit serious motor deficits and die soon after birth (Eicke, Briner. Willi, Uehlinger, & Boltshauser, 1992) . This indicates that at least some of the capacities of the thalamus must be functional in order to sustain life in the newborn. In addition, components of the diencephalon can be differentiated early in embryonic development (Kandel, Schwartz, & Jessell, 1991) . In infant monkeys, performance on explicit memory tasks is impaired by medial dorsal thalamic lesions to the same extent as is performance in adult monkeys given the same lesions (Goldman-Rakic, Isseroff, Schwartz, & Bugbee, 1984) . One interpretation of this result is that the thalamus is less able to compensate for injury and, therefore, is more functionally mature in infancy than some of the other areas involved in explicit memory.
In contrast to the relatively early development of the limbic and diencephalic components of the long-term declarative memory circuit, the frontal cortex is a late developing structure. Studies of the morphological development of the prefrontal cortex have examined development of Pyramidal Layers III (Koenderink, Uylings, & Mrzljak, 1994) and V (Koenderink & Uylings, 1995) of the human prefrontal cortex. In Layer III, dendritic length appears to stabilize to adult levels by 1 year of age. In Layer V, however, the lengths of dendrites, as well as soma size and the length of terminal segments, do not appear to stabilize until 5 years of age. In addition, synaptic density is thought to be highest in Layer III at about 8 months of age, and at about 2 years of age in Layer V (Huttenlocher, 1990) . After this peak, synaptic density is decreased, presumably by competitive pruning of unused connections. This pruning persists until middle to late childhood (Huttenlocher, 1994 ) and even into middle adolescence (Huttenlocher & Dabholkar, 1997) .
Glucose utilization and blood flow studies also indicate that the frontal cortex matures relatively late (Chugani et al., 1986) . Blood flow and glucose utilization increase above adult levels by 8 to 12 and 13 to 14 months of age, respectively. These results together with those of Huttenlocher (1994; Huttenlocher & Dabholkar, 1997) suggest that major developments in frontal lobe maturation may take place over the second half of the 1st year of life and continue into the early part of the 2nd year. Other maturational changes in frontal cortex, such as myelination, continue into adolescence (Johnson, 1997) .
Relatively little is known about the development of connections between components of the explicit memory system. Research with nonhuman primates, however, suggests that the developmental period corresponding to the end of the 1st year of life and the beginning of the 2nd year may be an important time for the development of these connections. In infant monkeys, redundant connections between medial temporal lobe structures and visual cortical association areas are apparent that are not found in adults (Webster, Ungerleider, & Bachevalier, 199la) . However, early lesions to the visual association area that normally receives these inputs in adulthood result in retention of redundant connections with other cortical areas (Webster et al., 1991b) . These results suggest that until about 3 months of age (corresponding to about 1 year in the human), connections between subcortical and cortical components of the explicit memory system are still undergoing developmental change.
In summary, the system involved in long-term explicit memory appears to involve several different brain regions. Some of these areas, such as the midline diencephalon, develop relatively early. Other areas, such as prefrontal cortex, are later developing structures. It is also clear from the damage sustained from lesions to each area that there are subtle differences in the functions carried out by them. For example, the prefrontal cortex seems to play a larger and more specific role in retrieval (especially over long delays) and in memory for temporal order than in memory formation or storage. Maturation of mnemonic functions in this system may be attributed to the increasing ability to perform tasks in which later maturing structures play a relatively more important role. Studies of the effects of lesions are important indicators of the role of neural structures in behavioral development. However, infants are not lesioned adults. Studies of behavior are also critically important for understanding the development of these areas.
Behavioral Evidence of the Course of Development of Long-Term Explicit Memory
In addition to cognitive neuroscience evidence of the time course of development of the neural system that subserves longterm explicit memory, there is evidence from the cognitive developmental literature to support the view that, whereas it continues to develop for years to come, explicit memory undergoes important developmental changes in the second half of the 1 st year of life. Several tasks can be used to measure infants' memory abilities (e.g., habituation, conjugate reinforcement, preference for novelty, A not B, deferred imitation). The results of the research with these tasks suggest that infants have a number of mnemonic capabilities from early in life but that behaviors indicative of long-term explicit memory emerge on a more protracted schedule. Because it is long-term explicit memory in which we are most interested, we confine our review to the literature concerning that ability.
Deferred Imitation as a Nonverbal Measure of Recall Memory
The young of our species neither speak nor understand language. For this reason, the typical method used to measure explicit memory, namely, verbal report, is unavailable as a research tool. Over the past decade, deferred imitation has emerged as a useful paradigm for studying long-term recall memory in preverbal infants. Piaget (1951 Piaget ( /1962 Piaget ( , 1952 Piaget ( /1963 has suggested that it is not until infants are able to represent events symbolically that they are able to imitate after a delay. He proposed that this ability coincides with the onset of the preoperational stage of cognitive development, at about 18-24 months of age. Contrary to this suggestion, deferred imitation of actions and action sequences has been demonstrated in infants as young as 6 months of age (Barr, Dowden, & Hayne, 1996) . In the deferred imitation procedure, infants are shown novel actions or sequences of actions enacted with props. After some delay, the infant is given the props and allowed to manipulate them. If the infant recreates the event, he or she is said to have recalled it.
There are a number of reasons to believe that deferred imitation taps recall memory processes (for further discussion, see Bauer, 1995 Bauer, , 1997 Mandler, 1990; Meltzoff, 1990; Squire, Knowlton, & Musen, 1993) . As discussed in Bauer (1995 Bauer ( ,1997 , if infants were performing the deferred imitation task by producing an implicitly learned motor skill, then, as in implicit learning tasks (Eichenbaum, Mathews, & Cohen, 1989; Squire et al., 1993; Tulving & Schacter, 1990) , performance on the task should be disrupted by context or surface feature changes between the time of learning and the time of the test. However, deferred imitation tests using changes of apparatus or testing room indicate no such susceptibility. allowed infants to imitate events using either the same props that were used in modeling or functionally equivalent but perceptually different props. Infants performed better on events they had seen before than on those they had not seen, whether they used the original or functionally equivalent props. In addition, infants were able to identify the props used in the original exposure session, suggesting that they did in fact recognize the props originally demonstrated (see also Lechuga, Marcos-Ruiz, & Bauer, 2001) .' In addition, infants imitate events in rooms that differ dramatically in appearance from those in which the events were first demonstrated for them (Barnat, Klein, & Meltzoff, 1996) . When infants experienced with events serve as the models for naive infants, naive infants are able to imitate events after a delay in the absence of the peer who had initially performed the demonstration (Hanna & Meltzoff, 1996) . Infants display the ability to imitate peers even when the memory test is given in a different environment from the original demonstration. For example, peers demonstrated events either in a laboratory setting or a day-care setting, and naive infants were able to imitate the events at home (Hanna & Meltzoff, 1996) . Infants are even able to remember events that they have only seen modeled on a television screen (Meltzoff, 1988a) .
It also is unlikely that events are "suggested" or "afforded" by the props rather than recalled. Some theories of perceptual and cognitive development (e.g., Gibson, 1982) suggest that infants' actions on objects are mediated by characteristics of the object. For example, a chair, because of its shape and sturdiness, affords sitting. Imitation of simple actions (e.g., Meltzoff, 1988b Meltzoff, , 1988c may be an indication that infants have come to understand what actions are afforded by some object. Because the object (the prop) is perceptually available to the infant, imitation of such actions may mean the infant is just doing what comes naturally. However, the results of a number of control conditions suggest that this is not the case. Meltzoff (1988b Meltzoff ( , 1998c used control conditions in which infants saw the objects used in the events but did not see the target actions performed on them. Infants who saw the target actions were more likely to produce them after the delay relative to infants who did not see the target actions. This result suggests that it is memory for the previously seen actions that drives infants' production of them, rather than simple exposure to the objects involved. What is more, some investigators have used event sequences wherein two or more actions are to be imitated by an infant in a particular temporal order (e.g., Bauer, 1992; Bauer & Fivush, 1992; Carver & Bauer, 1999; . In this case, although there is perceptual support for the individual actions involved in recreating the events, there is no perceptual support available for the order in which those actions are to be performed. Thus, accurate recall of correctly ordered event sequences is more likely due to explicit memory than to infants' deductions about the affordances of objects (Bauer, 1997; Bauer & Thai, 1990) .
Memories tested in deferred imitation also are verbally accessible. By necessity, evidence of verbal accessibility comes from children old enough to speak. Bauer, Kroupina, Schwade, Dropik, and Wewerka (1998) analyzed the spontaneous verbalizations of children who, at the ages of 22 to 32 months, returned to the laboratory to be tested for memory for specific novel event sequences to which they had been exposed at the ages of 16 and 20 months. Both age groups provided mnemonic verbalizations about event sequences that they had imitated prior to imposition of the 6-to 12-month delays. Twenty-month-olds also provided mnemonic verbalizations about events that they had only watched prior to the delays (see also Bauer & Wewerka, 1995 . These data provide clear evidence of the later verbal accessibility of memories for events experienced in the context of the deferred imitation paradigm.
There is also evidence, at least in adults, that deferred imitation performance is mediated by the neural substrate that subserves explicit memory. McDonough, Mandler, McKee, and Squire (1995) tested adults with amnesia and control participants in a deferred imitation task using multistep events. Whereas control participants performed as expected on the task, patients with amnesia did poorly. Indeed, they performed no better than control participants who had never seen the events demonstrated. Some of the patients studied by McDonough et al. suffered from amnesia caused by damage to the medial temporal lobe. Others suffered from Korsakoffs syndrome, which primarily damages the midline diencephalic region (Squire, 1986) . In addition, Korsakoffs syndrome can cause damage to a variety of other neural structures, including the frontal lobes (Shimamura, Jernigan, & Squire, 1988) . Because the frontal lobes are thought to be involved in temporal ordering tasks (Fuster, 1985) , one might wonder whether the deficit seen in some of the patients studied by McDonough et al. was due to an impairment in temporal ordering rather than in memory per se. To address this concern, McDonough et al. also included a control group of patients with damage limited to the frontal lobes. These patients performed as well as normal control participants on the task. Therefore, it is likely that, at least in adults, the deferred imitation task relies heavily on the structures that are damaged in amnesia.
' That young children remember specific aspects of the materials with which they were tested has been used as evidence that the explicit memories that they are forming are episodic, rather than semantic, in nature Lechuga et al., 2001) . Our only claim is that young infants are capable of long-term, temporally ordered explicit memory. This explicit memory may be episodic or semantic memory. Our data do not directly address this issue of the type of explicit memory developing, nor is the issue relevant for the arguments we make here.
Long-Term Recall Memory in Infants and Young Children
Using deferred imitation, researchers have begun to chart the course of development of long-term recall ability in the human infant. We first review the results of research with children in the 2nd year of life, the population on which the bulk of research has been conducted. We then review the results of the small number of studies of long-term recall by children in the 1 st year of life.
In the most comprehensive study of its kind to date, Bauer, Wenner, Dropik, and Wewerka (2000) used deferred imitation to test long-term recall in children who were ages 13, 16, and 20 months at the time of experience of specific novel multistep event sequences. Separate groups of children were tested after delay intervals of 1, 3,6,9, and 12 months. Thus, the study provided data on long-term recall by children throughout the 2nd and into the 3rd year of life (i.e., the children were 14-32 months at the time of their delayed-recall tests). Age-related changes in both the reliability and the robustness of recall were observed; developmental differences were particularly apparent under conditions of greater cognitive challenge.
Children who had been 20 months of age at the time of exposure to the novel event sequences showed evidence of memory of both the individual target actions and the temporal order of actions of the sequences even after the longest delay interval of 12 months. In contrast, children who had been 13 months of age at the time of exposure to the event sequences showed evidence of memory for the individual target actions for 6 months; they showed evidence of memory for the temporal order of actions of the sequences for only 3 months. The performance of the children who had been 16 months of age at the time of experience of the event sequences showed retention over periods that were intermediate and did not differ reliably from those of either the younger or the older age groups (see Bauer, Wenner, et al., 2000 , for procedural and analytic details).
In addition to evidence that, with age, children are able to remember specific novel event sequences for longer periods of time, Bauer, Wenner, et al. (2000) also provided evidence of increasingly robust memory over the course of the 2nd year: The older children in the study remembered more than the younger children. Age-related differences in the amount remembered were particularly apparent under conditions of greater cognitive demand (e.g., in children's ordered recall relative to their recall of the individual target actions of the events; at the longer, relative to the shorter, retention intervals). The age-related increases in the reliability and robustness of long-term recall over the 2nd and into the 3rd year are suggestive of the consolidation of long-term mnemonic function over this space of time.
Clearly, if long-term recall ability is consolidating over the course of the 2nd and into the 3rd year of life, then it must have emerged earlier in development. As noted above, on the basis of neuroanatomical and neurophysiological developments, Nelson (1995) and Schacter and Moscovitch (1984) suggested the second half of the 1st year as a likely time for the newly emergent function. Although the number of relevant studies is small, their results are consistent with this time frame. Specifically, Carver and Bauer (1999) found that, as a group, 9-month-old infants were able to recall the individual target actions of two-step event sequences over a 1-month delay. However, only 14 of 31 infants (45%) showed evidence of temporally ordered recall memory over the same delay; the remaining 17 of 31 infants (55%) did not show evidence of temporally ordered recall. This pattern since has been replicated in two independent samples of 9-month-olds (Bauer, Johnson, Carver, Waters, & Nelson, 2000; Bauer, Wiebe, Waters, & Bradley, in press) .
In contrast to 9-month-old infants, infants 6 months of age show quite limited capacity for ordered recall after a delay. Barr et al. (1996) tested infants as young as 6 months of age for immediate and 24-hr delayed recall of a three-step action sequence. Barr et al. found that 75% of 6-month-olds imitated at least one action after the 24-hr delay. These data thus provide evidence of recall over the short term as early as 6 months. What was not apparent in Barr et al.'s data was compelling evidence of ordered recall over the delay. Specifically, whereas 75% of 6-month-olds produced one action after the 24-hr delay, only 25% of them provided evidence of memory for more than one step of the sequence. Given the greater role of retrieval mechanisms in temporally ordered recall compared with perceptually supported recall of individual target actions, the dramatic difference in levels of performance in these two aspects of the task is particularly noteworthy. A similar "dissociation" between recall of content and recall of temporal order recently was reported in an adult patient in whom the integrity of the cortico-limbic-diencephalic circuit that supports explicit memory was undermined by damage to the tissue connecting the frontal lobe and the hippocampus (Yasuno et al., 1999) . In the case of Barr et al.'s 6-month-olds, we attribute the low level of ordered recall not to neural damage but to insufficient functional maturity of the neural substrate implicated in support of ordered recall.
The results of Bauer, Wenner, et al. (2000) suggest that by 13 months of age, long-term recall ability is relatively well established. In contrast, the results from Barr et al. (1996) suggest that at 6 months of age, there is only a fledgling capacity for ordered recall over the brief term. Consistent with speculations grounded in cognitive developmental neuroscience, 9 months seems to be an important transitional age: At the age of 9 months, roughly 50% of infants demonstrate the ability to remember complete events over the long term whereas roughly 50% do not (e.g., Bauer, Johnson, et al., 2000; Bauer et al., in press; Carver & Bauer, 1999) . Our hypothesis is that a bimodal distribution is observed because in roughly half of infants 9 months of age the full substrate that underlies explicit memory is sufficiently (though not fully) functionally mature to support recall over the long term, whereas in the other half of infants, the full circuit is not sufficiently functionally mature. If this suggestion has merit, then what should be observed is that, as infants' ages at the time of exposure to to-beremembered material increase incrementally, the reliability of infants' long-term recall also should increase incrementally. Moreover, the lengths of time over which infants are able to remember should increase as well.
To test these suggestions, in four experiments we examined long-term recall ability in 9-and 10-month-old infants. In Experiment 1, a subset of the 9-month-olds tested after 1 month in Carver and Bauer (1999) were tested again after a delay of 3 months. The 3-month delay provided an opportunity to test for recall of events first experienced at 9 months and experienced again at the 10-month test, as well as for recall of events first experienced at the age of 10 months. If, as expected, the latter part of the 1 st year of life is one of significant development in long-term recall ability, then infants exposed to to-be-remembered material at 10 months should show stronger evidence of long-term recall memory than they did for material to which they were exposed at 9 months. A delay of 3 months was chosen for both practical and theoretical reasons. Practically, it was the shortest delay over which we could complete testing for the original study (Carver & Bauer, 1999) and arrange for the follow-up testing. Theoretically, it is not clear how long a delay must be in order to tap the full neural circuit underlying long-term recall memory. Over the initial days and weeks following learning, hippocampal lesions impair performance, suggesting that medial temporal areas are important for at least this space of time. Over delays of several months, the participation of the full circuit is virtually certainly required (see McGaugh, 2000 , for discussion).
To anticipate the results of Experiment 1, we found that infants were able to remember for 3 months events to which they had been reexposed or exposed for the first time at the age of 10 months. This pattern thus indicates a more reliable long-term recall memory system in 10-month-olds relative to 9-month-olds. To further examine this suggestion, in Experiments 2 and 3 we conducted parallel investigations of the abilities of 9-and 10-month-olds, respectively, to recall after delay intervals of 1 and 3 months. The studies thus provide a direct test of the possibility of differences in the lengths of time over which material can be recalled as a function of age. The specific hypotheses tested were that, because of coalescence of the neural substrate supporting long-term recall, (a) after 1 month, 9-month-olds would show less robust memory, relative to 10-month-olds, and (b) 10-month-olds would remember over the longer delay interval of 3 months, whereas 9-month-olds would not.
Finally, Experiment 4 was a test of the limits of long-term recall ability in 10-month-old infants. A subset of the 9-month-olds tested after 1 month in Carver and Bauer (1999) were tested again after a delay of 6 months. The subset of infants tested after 6 months in Experiment 4 was different from the subset tested after 3 months in Experiment I. The 6-month delay provided an opportunity to test for recall of events first experienced at 9 months and experienced again at the 10-month test, as well as for recall of events first experienced at the age of 10 months. The delay of 6 months was selected based on the results of Bauer, Wenner, et al. (2000) : It was the longest interval over which the youngest infants in that sample, namely, 13-month-olds, showed evidence of memory.
General Method

Participants
Typically developing infants were enrolled in each experiment. Infants were recruited from an existing pool of volunteer parents who had expressed interest in participating in research following their infants' births. Infants included in Experiment 1 were a subset of those who had participated in Carver and Bauer (1999) . In the present study they were tested at 13 months of age for events experienced at 9 and 10 months (three events) and at 10 months only (three events). Infants in Experiments 2 and 3 were enrolled within I week of their 9-month birthday (Experiment 2) or their 10-month birthday (Experiment 3). Infants included in Experiment 4 were a subset of those who had participated in Carver and Bauer's study. In the present study they were tested at 16 months of age for events experienced at 9 and 10 months (three events) and at 10 months only (three events). All infants were tested for the first time within 1 week of their 9-month (Experiment 2) or 10-month (Experiments 1, 3, and 4) birthdays. All infants were full term, and their parents reported no history of neurological, perinatal, or other serious health problems. The majority of infants were Caucasian and from middle-class homes. Infants' participation was acknowledged with gifts of age-appropriate toys.
Stimuli
Infants were tested using a set of novel two-step event sequences. Previous research has shown that infants recall events better when there are enabling relations between the actions (i.e., when, in order to reach a particular end state or goal, one action in a sequence must be produced before another in the same sequence; e.g., Bauer, 1992) . Indeed, until approximately 20 months of age, infants' ordered recall of event sequences lacking enabling relations is not reliably different from chance (e.g., Bauer, Hertsgaard, Dropik, & Daly, 1998; Wenner & Bauer, 1999) . To give infants the best opportunity for imitating successfully, we required enabling relations in the order of all multistep events.
2 That is, although infants could attempt an action (and thereby receive credit for it), they could not successfully complete an action until the preceding action was completed. An example of such an event is "Make Big Bird turn on the light." In this event, the infant must place a plastic car containing the character Big Bird into the top of an L-shaped base. The infant then must push a plunger, causing the car to move down the length of the base and illuminate a light. In this event, the infant can do the second action (push the plunger) before he or she does the first but can only affect the illumination of the light if the second step follows the first. Infants were tested using a set of 17 two-step events. Six of these events had been used in a previous study (Carver & Bauer, 1999) and were described in that report. The remaining 11 events are described in the Appendix.
Procedure
For all experiments, the infants were tested individually in a laboratory playroom. After an initial warm-up period during which the experimenter established rapport with the infant and addressed any questions that the parent or parents had about the procedure, the infant was seated in a booster seat across an adult-sized table from the experimenter.
All infants were tested using elicited imitation. As previously discussed, in elicited imitation, infants imitate actions or sequences of actions enacted with props. During the initial visit to the lab, for each event sequence in turn, infants were allowed to manipulate the props for an infant-controlled baseline procedure. The baseline assessment was used to determine whether infants spontaneously produce target actions before they are modeled. The infants were allowed to manipulate the props until they were no longer interested in them. Typically, infants displayed their disinterest by pushing the props back to the experimenter, by throwing the props on the floor, or by engaging in repetitive behaviors such as mouthing or banging the props. Infant-controlled, rather than experimenter-controlled, periods were used because of variability in the lengths of time over which infants remain engaged with the objects (e.g., Bauer & Hertsgaard, 1993) . In previous research, it has been shown that variability in the duration of the baseline interval cannot account for infants' recall performance after the delay (Bauer, Wenner, et al., 2000) .
After the baseline interval was concluded, the experimenter modeled the event sequences two times in succession. In Experiments 1 and 4, infants were permitted to imitate the event sequences immediately after modeling and, thus, prior to imposition of the 3-and 6-month delays (respectively). In Experiments 2 and 3, a deferred imitation procedure was used. That is, infants were not allowed to manipulate the props after the events were modeled. Instead, after the events were modeled, a delay was imposed. Infants returned to the lab after the delay interval and were again given the props used in the events. Procedurally, the delayed-recall period was identical to the infant-controlled baseline period in the initial session. After the infant indicated that he or she was no longer interested in the eventrelated props, the experimenter modeled the events two times in succession. The props then were returned to the infant. The procedure provided a way of measuring immediate imitation (for new events the infant had not seen previously) and savings in releaming (for old events the infant had seen previously). Because infants' performance in the immediate imitation and relearning phases is not directly relevant to the questions of this research, we do not present the data here (details are available from Leslie J. Carver).
The imitation procedure produces two dependent variables that can be used to measure infants' event memories. Infants' memories can be assessed as a function of the number of individual target actions they produced and as a function of the number of pairs of target actions produced in the previously modeled order. The latter measure, production of correctly ordered pairs of target actions, is an important measure of the function of the prefrontal aspects of the explicit memory system. Memory for the sequential order of events has been associated with prefrontal function (e.g., Jetter et al., 1986 ). The infant not only must remember what to do with the props but also must remember the temporal order in which these actions are to be produced in the absence of perceptual support for order information (see Bauer, Wenner, et al., 2000 , for additional discussion of the significance of the measure of temporal order).
One means of assessing whether infants remembered the event sequences is to compare production of target actions and pairs of target actions after the delay with production during the baseline interval in the first session. This procedure is potentially confounded, however, by the different developmental ages of the infant at the two test sessions. That is, the infant is older by the length of the delay when tested for memory. Improvement in performance over baseline in this case may reflect maturation in general cognitive functioning and, as a result, better problemsolving skills rather than memory. To address this issue, in Experiments 1 and 4, we compared infants' performance on events they had seen before with performance on events that they had not seen before. This procedure eliminates possible confounds related to the age of the infant but does not allow for testing infant memory on the same events before and after a delay. Accordingly, in Experiments 2 and 3, events were presented in counterbalanced order so that each event was modeled before the delay (previously experienced or "old" events) and used for the control condition after the delay (not previously experienced or "new" events) an equivalent number of times. In addition, in each experiment, each event was presented in each serial position an equivalent number of times.
Data Reduction and Analysis
For each experiment, two raters were trained on an existing corpus of deferred imitation data and established reliability at greater than 90% on a set of six sessions in which event sequences similar to those used in the current study were used. A primary rater observed and recorded the infants' behaviors from the videotape record, noting occurrence and order of target actions performed by each participant. For purposes of reliability, samples of 25% of the sessions were selected from each experiment and were rated by the second rater. Agreement between the two raters exceeded 85% for each experiment. The proportion of target actions and correctly ordered pairs of target actions produced by each infant was calculated from these data, and a grand mean was obtained for the sample in each experiment. Because of the long delays involved in this study, only the comparisons of production of old and new events at the delay test are reported. Comparisons between production of target actions and pairs of target actions during baseline and after the delay are not reported (in all cases, performance after the delays was greater than performance in the baseline assessment periods; details are available from Leslie J. Carver).
Experiment 1
In Carver and Bauer (1999) , 9-month-old infants were shown three novel two-step event sequences. Their memories for the events were tested 1 month later using deferred imitation. Whether the children remembered the events to which they had been exposed at 9 months was determined by comparisons of their performance on previously experienced events with their performance on event sequences new to them at the time of the delayed-recall test. Previously experienced and new events were tested in the same manner: After an initial child-controlled response period, the sequences were modeled two times in succession with narration. The infants then were provided the opportunity to imitate the event sequences. For previously experienced event sequences, the premodeling phase served as the delayed-recall test; for the new event sequences, it served as a baseline assessment. For previously experienced event sequences, modeling served as a reexposure to the target sequences; for the new event sequences, modeling served as an initial exposure to the target sequences. For previously experienced event sequences, the postmodeling phase served as a test of relearning; for the new event sequences, it served as a test of immediate recall.
As reported in Carver and Bauer (1999) , at the age of 10 months, the infants recalled the individual actions composing the events to which they had been exposed at 9 months. In contrast, as a group, they did not recall the order in which the events occurred. The major question in the present experiment was whether, after 3 months, the infants would show evidence of recall of the event sequences to which they had been exposed at 10 months.
Method
Participants. Fourteen infants (8 girls and 6 boys) who had participated in Carver and Bauer (1999) returned to the laboratory after a delay of 3 months (±1 week). Of the returning infants, 8 had recalled the temporal order of events at age 10 months whereas 6 had not.
Stimuli. The stimuli were nine novel two-step event sequences. Six of the sequences had been used in Carver and Bauer (1999) ; the other three sequences were drawn from a pool of six event sequences created for use in testing recall after the 3-month delay that is the subject of this report. These six events are listed in the Appendix (Nos. 1-6).
All of the infants had previous experience with six of the event sequences. As depicted in the top panel of Table 1 , they had been exposed to three of the event sequences at the age of 9 months (i.e., event sequences, A, B, C) and had been tested for memory of them 1 month later, at 10 months. In addition, at 10 months, as a within-subjects control, the infants had been tested on three new event sequences (i.e., event sequences D, E, F). In the present experiment, the infants returned to the laboratory at the age of 13 months (see Table 1 , top panel). At that time, they were tested on (a) the three event sequences to which they originally had been exposed at 9 months and on which they were tested for recall at 10 months, (b) the three event sequences that had served as their control events at 10 months, and (c) three new event sequences (i.e., event sequences G, H, I) as a within-subjects control. Procedure and scoring. For each event sequence in turn, the experimenter provided the event-related props to the infant for an infantcontrolled premodeling assessment period. The experimenter then modeled each event sequence two times in succession with narration. The infants then were given an opportunity to imitate the events.
At each session, infants' behaviors were videotaped and coded by individuals unaware of which events the infants had seen before, as well as of the memory performance of the infants in the originating study (i.e., Carver & Bauer, 1999) . The coders indicated infants' production of the individual target actions of the event sequences as well as their production of correctly ordered pairs of actions. For the latter measure, as in previous related research (e.g., Bauer, Wenner, et al., 2000; Carver & Bauer, 1999) , only the first occurrence of each target action was considered. For example, in "Make Big Bird turn on the light," if infants produced both of the individual target actions in the target order, they would receive credit for two different target actions and for one correctly ordered pair of actions. If infants produced the string of actions 2, 1,2, they would be credited with two different target actions, but not with a correctly ordered pair. They would not be credited with the Pair 1-2, because they already would have been credited with Action 2. This scoring procedure reduces the likelihood of infants' receiving credit for production of a sequence by chance or by trial and error.
It should be noted that the two dependent measures are not independent of one another: The number of individual actions produced affects production of pairs of actions in the target order. Nevertheless, it is possible for an infant to earn full credit on the number of different target actions produced and not earn credit for any pairs of actions in the target order. Thus, differences in the number of pairs of actions produced in the target order cannot be attributed solely to differences in production of individual target actions. Moreover, although it is the case that, by definition, component actions joined by enabling relations must occur in one and only one order, for scoring purposes, infants were credited with a component action regardless of the order in which it occurred. For example, infants could be credited with pushing the plunger (Step 2) regardless of whether or not they already had put Big Bird's car into the L-shaped base (Step 1). Thus, even on sequences constrained by enabling relations, ordered recall cannot be attributed to physical constraints imposed by the stimuli or their manner of combination.
Data analysis. Dependent measures were the number of individual target actions performed and the number of pairs of actions performed in the correct order. Data were analyzed using repeated measures analyses of variance (ANOVAs) for the variable age at exposure based on when infants had first seen the event demonstrated (9 months, 10 months, or 13 months). Separate analyses were conducted for each dependent measure. Post hoc tests on significant main effects were conducted using Fisher's protected least significant difference (PLSD) test at the p < .05 level.
Results and Discussion
For both dependent measures, main effects of age at exposure were found: F(2, 24) = 14.04, p < .0001, for individual target actions; F(2, 24) = 6.28, p < .01, for pairs of target actions. Infants produced both more target actions and more pairs of actions for events that they had seen at the initial session when they were 9 months old than they did for events new to them at the age of 13 months. Infants also produced more target actions and more correctly ordered pairs of target actions for events to which they had first been exposed at the age of 10 months than they did for events new to them at the age of 13 months. Infants' production of target actions and correctly ordered target actions is displayed in Figure 1 . There was no difference in production of individual target actions or pairs of actions in target order as a function of the number of times that the infants had been exposed to the events: Infants' levels of performance on events first experienced at the age of 9 months and events first experienced at the age of 10 months did not differ. The infants recalled both the individual target actions and the temporal order of actions of the event sequences. Moreover, they performed equally well on events to which they had been exposed multiple times (i.e., those first experienced at 9 months and reexperienced at 10 months) and on events to which they had been exposed only one time (i.e., those experienced one time at the age of 10 months). Infants' performance at 10 months of age was not related to their performance at 13 months of age. That is, among the infants who recalled events in the present experiment were infants who had imitated events at 10 months and infants who had not imitated events at 10 months.
Experiment 1 showed that early in the 2nd year of life (i.e., at 13 months), infants are able to retrieve representations of events experienced late in the 1st year of life (i.e., at 10 months). This result provides support for the hypothesis that the memory system available to infants at the end of the 1st year of life is sufficient to support encoding and retrieval of representations from long-term memory stores. One possible alternative explanation for the infants' apparent abilities to recall events that they either had experienced or reexperienced fully 3 months earlier is that they produced actions and pairs of actions as a result of problem solving, rather than memory per se. That is, it is possible that over the 3-month delay between sessions, infants' problem-solving skills improved, allowing them to be able to figure out how to produce the target sequences. However, the data from the event sequences new to the infants at the time delayed recall was tested suggest that this is not the case. If infants' improved problem-solving skills permitted them to produce the events, they should have performed equally well on new and old events. Instead, infants performed better on events that they had seen previously relative to events that were new to them. In addition, infants who had not demonstrated ordered recall at 10 months of age (see Carver & Bauer, 1999 ) "caught up," such that in the present study they recalled events as well as their peers who already had demonstrated ordered recall at 10 months of age.
There are three factors that might limit the strength of conclusions that can be drawn from Experiment 1. First, in the case of the event sequences to which the infants had been exposed at the age of 9 months, the infants had multiple experiences of the event sequences. Substantial research on infant memory indicates that reminding infants of to-be-remembered events at key points in the forgetting function can greatly enhance their performance on subsequent memory tests (Bauer et al., in press; Hayne & RoveeCollier, 1995; Hudson & Sheffield, 1995; Rovee-Collier, Evancia, & Barley, 1995) . Thus, infants' memory for the events could have been reinstated by the repeated exposure to the events and props. In this regard it is important to note that the infants also showed evidence of memory for the event sequences to which they had been exposed only once, at the age of 10 months. This makes clear that at least by 10 months of age, reminding infants of to-beremembered event sequences is not necessary to ensure long-term retention of them.
Second, although reminding infants of to-be-remembered event sequences apparently is not necessary to ensure long-term retention, the present experiment leaves open the possibility that imitation of events prior to imposition of long delays is necessary to ensure long-term retention. That is, in Experiment 1, the infants had been permitted to imitate the event sequences prior to imposition of the 3-month delay; imitation was permitted both of the events first experienced at 9 months and of the events experienced for the first time at 10 months. It is doubtful that long-term retention is dependent on prior imitation: There is considerable evidence that the opportunity to imitate event sequences one time prior to imposition of a delay has no effect on subsequent memory performance (i.e., levels of performance on events imitated one time do not differ from those on events only watched; Bauer, Wenner, et al., 2000) . Nevertheless, stronger conclusions about 10-month-olds' long-term recall abilities could be drawn if they were shown to remember event sequences they had only watched, as well as event sequences that they had been permitted to imitate.
Finally, recall that in Experiment 1, one set of events was always seen by infants when they were 9 and 10 months old, and a different set of events was always used when infants were 13 months old. Although the events were designed to be similar to each other and to those used in previous studies (e.g., Bauer, Hertsgaard, & Dow, 1994) , in the number of steps that composed them and the enabling relations between steps, there may have been something unique about the events used in Carver and Bauer (1999) that allowed infants to perform better on those events in particular. Thus, the mnemonic effect may have been influenced by the specific events themselves.
Experiments 2 and 3 were designed to address the possible limitations of Experiment 1, as well as to provide a more direct test of the abilities of 9-and 10-month-olds to recall event sequences after delays of 1 and 3 months. To ensure that long-term retention is not dependent on the opportunity to imitate prior to imposition of the delay, we tested the infants in Experiments 2 and 3 in a fully deferred protocol. That is, they were not permitted to imitate any of the event sequences prior to imposition of the delays. To ensure that patterns of performance were not affected by the specific sequences to which the infants were exposed, we completely counterbalanced the design. By testing both 9-month-olds (Experiment 2) and 10-month-olds (Experiment 3) on unique event sequences after delays of 1 and 3 months, we were able to evaluate the relative robustness of long-term recall abilities at two different points during what is hypothesized to be an important period in the development of the neural substrate underlying long-term recall (Carver & Bauer, 1999; Nelson, 1995; Schacter & Moscovitch, 1984) .
Experiment 2
Method
Participants. Twenty-four 9-month-old (±1 week) infants were enrolled in the experiment. Thirteen of the infants were girls.
Stimuli. Infants were tested using novel two-step event sequences. Six of these events were taken from Carver and Bauer (1999) and were described in that report. Additional events were drawn from a supplemental set of events, described in the Appendix (Nos. 1-9). Events were presented in random counterbalanced order so that no event was seen more often than any other event, and no event was old for any more infants than those for whom it was new.
Procedure. The schedule of test sessions and the tasks completed during each session are shown in the top panel of Table 2 . At 9 months of age, infants were seen for two laboratory sessions. During the first session, each infant was shown four events (i.e.. A, B, C, D). After the infantcontrolled baseline period, the experimenter modeled each event two times in succession. The second session occurred between 1 and 3 days after the first session. The mean interval between Sessions 1 and 2 was 1.28 days (SD = 0.46 days). During the second session, the experimenter again modeled each event two times in succession. The infants were not allowed to manipulate the props used in the events after modeling in Session 1 or in Session 2.
One month (±3 days) after the two exposure sessions the infants returned for a third laboratory session. The infants were given the props used in two of the events that they had seen at the initial sessions (A, B), alternated with the props for two new events (E, F). Each infant was also tested for immediate imitation of two events during the 10-month session (G, H). These events are described in the Appendix (Nos. 10 and 11). The purpose of this test was to determine whether the infants' general imitation abilities were different from those of infants tested in Experiment 3 (discussed below), who were tested on the same paradigm and schedule beginning at 10 months of age. In this condition, infants received the props for an infant-controlled baseline period. The experimenter then demonstrated the events two times in succession. Immediately after this demonstration, infants were allowed to imitate the events. Infants' performance on the immediate imitation events is discussed in the context of the results of Experiment 3.
Two months (±5 days) after the third visit, the infants returned for a final laboratory session. During this session, infants were given the props used in the remaining two events they had originally seen at 9 months of age (C, D). In addition, infants were given the props used for two new events (I, J), as a within-subjects control. Events were presented in counterbalanced order so that no event was presented in the same serial position more often than any other event.
Data reduction. Data were coded as described in the General Method section. Interrater reliability on 6 of 24 participants (25%) was 85% (range = 76%-91%). On two occasions, the props needed for one event were not available for testing. Because of this, proportion scores were calculated to compare infants' production of old and new events.
Results
Infants' levels of performance on previously experienced and new event sequences after 1 and 3 months are represented in Figures 2 and 3 , respectively. To determine whether 9-month-olds were able to remember events after a delay of 1 month, a one-way ANOVA was conducted for each dependent measure. For target actions, a main effect of condition was observed, F(l, 23) = 4.97, p < .05. After a delay of 1 month, infants produced more target actions for events they had seen before than for new events. Infants did not produce significantly more correctly ordered pairs of target actions for old events than for new events, although there was a trend in that direction, F(l, 23) = 3.01, p = .10. To determine whether the infants remembered the events after the 3-month delay, we conducted one-way ANOVAs. When tested after a delay of 3 months on events to which they had first been exposed at age 9 months, the infants did not produce more target actions, F(l, 23) = 2.29, p = .14, or more correctly ordered pairs of target actions, F(l, 23) = 2.00, p = .17, for old than for new events. Thus, there was not evidence that the infants remembered the event sequences over the delay of 3 months.
Discussion
Nine-month-olds were able to imitate target actions after a delay of 1 month. Infants also remembered pairs of target actions in the correct order, although this finding only approached statistical significance. These results represent a replication of those obtained in Carver and Bauer (1999) . Although Carver and Bauer found that some infants could imitate correctly ordered pairs of target actions, this is the first suggestion that, as a group, 9-month-olds are able to imitate pairs of target actions after a delay of 1 month.
Whereas infants who had been 9 months of age at the time of exposure to specific event sequences remembered them for a period of 1 month, there was no evidence that infants recalled target actions or pairs of actions in the target order after 3 months. This finding suggests that although at the age of 9 months infants may be able to encode event representations and retrieve them after a relatively long delay, they are unable to retrieve representations of similar events when the delay is extended by 2 months. This result suggests that what is lacking in these infants was not the ability to encode events but rather the ability to store them over very long delays (cf. Howe & Courage, 1997) , to retrieve them over very long delays, or both. In Experiment 3 we tested whether the apparent limitations on the storage and retrieval of event representations over long delays experienced by 9-month-olds are still apparent 1 month later, among 10-month-old infants. To address this question, we conducted Experiment 3 in a fashion parallel to Experiment 2. The only difference was that at the time of enrollment, the infants in Experiment 3 were 10 months of age, as opposed to the 9-month-olds enrolled in Experiment 2. We reasoned that, if the capacity for long-term recall increases over the last half of the 1st year of life, 10-month-olds should be able to retain event representations over both the 1-and 3-month delay intervals. Alternatively, if infants' memory performance is not dependent on the development of systems that allow for very long-term recall, or if such developments do not occur late in the 1st year of life, 10-month-olds' performance on a long-term recall test should not differ from that of 9-month-olds.
Experiment 3
Method
Participants. Twenty-three 10-month-old (± 1 week) infants were enrolled in the experiment. Eleven of the infant were girls. An additional infant was tested but was not included in the final sample because she did not return for the final session. None of the infants who had participated in Experiment 2 participated in Experiment 3.
Stimuli. Infants were tested with the same stimuli as were used in Experiment 2.
Procedure. The procedure used in Experiment 3 was identical to that used in Experiment 2. To determine whether the infants in this group differed in imitation ability (but not necessarily in long-term memory ability) from the infants in Experiment 2, infants were tested on the same two novel events as the infants in Experiment 2 had been during their 10-month visit (see the Procedure section of Experiment 2). This test occurred at the end of the second exposure session. The schedule of sessions for Experiment 3 is shown in the bottom panel of Table 2 .
Data reduction. Data were coded as described in the General Methods section. Interrater reliability on 6 of 23 participants (26%) was 87% (range = 82%-93%). Proportion scores were calculated to compare infants' production of old and new events.
Results
Performance after 1 and 3 months. Infants' levels of performance on previously experienced and new event sequences after 1 and 3 months are represented in Figures 4 and 5 , respectively. The tests used to determine whether infants remembered the events after delays of 1 and 3 months in Experiment 2 were repeated for Experiment 3. A main effect of condition was observed for both dependent variables at the 1-month test. After a delay of 1 month, the infants produced more target actions for previously experienced than for new events, F(\, 22) = 7.87, p < .01. Infants also produced more correctly ordered pairs of target actions for previously experienced than for new events, F(\, 22) = 6.75, p < .02. After a delay of 3 months, infants produced more target actions for previously experienced than for new events, F(l, 21) = 7.84, p < .01. Infants also produced more correctly ordered pairs of target actions for previously experienced than for new events, F(l, 21) = 6.64, p < .02. Thus, in contrast to infants 9 months of age at the time of exposure to event sequences, infants 10 months of age at the time of experience of specific novel events remembered them for as long as 3 months.
Comparison of immediate recall performance of infants in Experiments 2 and 3. Observed differences in patterns of performance between the infants enrolled in Experiments 2 and 3 may be related to chance differences in the composition of the groups rather than development in memory function. That is, it may be that the infants who happened to be enrolled in Experiment 3 were simply "smarter" than the infants who happened to be enrolled in Experiment 2 (i.e., the difference in performance was a trait difference not related to maturation). If this were the case, the superior performance on the part of the infants in Experiment 3 could not be attributed to memory development but could instead be attributed to differences in general cognitive ability between the groups. To test this possibility, at the age of 10 months (i.e., the 1-month-delayed-recall test for the infants in Experiment 2; the time of enrollment for the infants in Experiment 3), we tested all infants for immediate recall of the same two 2-step event sequences. Infants were shown the events and immediately were allowed to imitate them.
Descriptive statistics on the children's performance on the immediate imitation task are provided in Table 3 . We conducted 2 (recall: baseline, imitation) X 2 (Experiment: 1, 2) ANOVAs to determine whether there were systematic differences between the infants in the two experiments. Across experiments, on both dependent measures, the infants showed higher levels of performance after modeling than they had before modeling: F(l, 42) = 132.91, p < .0001, for individual target actions; F(l, 40) = 77.38, p < .0001, for pairs of actions in target order. More important for present purposes, main effects of experiment were obtained, for both dependent measures: F(l, 42) = 4.28, p < .05, for individual target actions; F(l, 40) = 12.33, p < .001, for pairs of actions in target order. The main effects could not, however, account for the differential patterns of performance by the 9-and 10-month-old infants: The infants in Experiment 2 produced both more individ- exposed to test events at 9 months, was due to uncontrolled differences between the groups that favored the 10-month-olds.
Discussion
Infants who entered the study at 10 months of age produced both more individual target actions and more correctly ordered pairs of actions for previously experienced than for new events at both the 1-and 3-month delays. We suggest that the difference in performance between the infants enrolled at the age of 9 months and the infants enrolled at the age of 10 months be attributed to greater relative maturity of the neural substrate underlying long-term recall in the older compared with the younger infants. In the final experiment we tested whether 3 months represents the upper limit on 10-month-olds' abilities to recall. In Experiment 4, we tested 10-month-old infants' recall after an interval of 6 months. We selected 6 months because it is the longest interval over which children early in the 2nd year of life have shown recall (Bauer, Wenner, et al., 2000) .
Experiment 4
In Experiment 1, we reported the results of a 3-month-delayedrecall test for a subset of the infants who had participated in Carver and Bauer (1999) . In Experiment 4, a different subset of infants was tested at the age of 16 months for recall of events either first experienced or reexperienced at the age of 10 months.
Method
Participants. Eight infants (4 girls and 4 boys) who had participated in Carver and Bauer (1999) returned to the laboratory after a delay of 6 months (± 1 week). Of the returning participants, 4 had recalled the temporal order of events at 10 months whereas 4 had not.
Stimuli, procedure, scoring, and data analysis. The stimuli, procedure, scoring, and data analysis were the same as in Experiment 1. The only procedural difference between the two experiments was in the length of the delay between exposure or reexposure to the test events at 10 months and the rime at which long-term recall was tested: In Experiment 1, the delay was 3 months, whereas in Experiment 4, the delay was 6 months (see the bottom panel of Table 1 ).
Results and Discussion
Infants' production of target actions and correctly ordered pairs of target actions in Experiment 4 is displayed in Figure 6 . In terms of the number of individual target actions produced, there was a main effect for age at exposure, F(2, 14) = 5.85, p < .01. After a delay of 6 months, infants produced more individual target actions for events that they had first seen at the initial session when they were 9 months of age than they did for events new to them at the age of 16 months. The infants also produced more individual target actions of the events to which they had first been exposed at the age of 10 months than they did for events new to them at 16 months. There was no difference in production of the individual target actions as a function of the number of times that the infants had been exposed to the event sequences: Infants' levels of performance on events first experienced at the age of 9 months and events first experienced at the age of 10 months did not differ (see Figure 6 ). As in Experiment 1, in the present experiment, infants imitated events regardless of whether they had successfully imitated them at 10 months of age (Carver & Bauer, 1999) . These data provide evidence that at 16 months of age, infants are able to recall at least some details of events they had seen fully 6 months earlier.
Infants also produced more correctly ordered pairs of target actions for the events first experienced at the age of 9 months and first experienced at the age of 10 months, relative to event sequences that were new to them. The effect did not, however, reach the conventional level of statistical significance, F(2, 14) = 3.14, p = .07. Thus, infants recalled the sequence in which ordered actions were to be produced, although their memory for sequential order was less reliable than memory for order over shorter delays. This finding suggests that the substrate that underlies explicit memory is by no means fully intact at 10 months of age. Because the testing protocol used in this experiment was the same as that used in Experiment 1, the cautions concerning interpretation raised in the context of the first experiment in the present series also apply to this final experiment. Nevertheless, as a demonstration of recall over a period of 6 months by infants only 10 months of age at the time of experience or reexperience of specific novel event sequences, the results of this experiment are noteworthy.
General Discussion
The primary goal of this series of experiments was to examine the course of development of long-term recall ability in the latter part of the 1 st year of life. On the basis of previous related research (i.e., Bauer, Johnson, et al., 2000; Bauer et al., in press; Carver & Bauer, 1999) , we expected to observe age-related differences in the reliability and robustness of long-term recall by infants 9 months of age and infants older than 9 months. The expectation was derived from speculation that between 8 and 12 months of age, the neural system that subserves long-term explicit memory begins to coalesce (e.g., Nelson, 1995; Schacter & Moscovitch, 1984) . Figure 6 . Infants' production of target actions and correctly ordered pairs of target actions in Experiment 4. Events the infants first saw at age 9 months in Carver and Bauer (1999) Experiment 1 provided evidence that the same infants who as a group did not demonstrate ordered recall after 1 month of events experienced as 9-month-olds nevertheless demonstrated ordered recall after 3 months of events experienced as 10-month-olds. Thus, after only 1 month of additional development, the infants in Experiment 1 provided substantially stronger evidence of longterm recall ability, relative to their demonstration as 9-month-olds in the Carver and Bauer study. Experiments 2 and 3 provided converging evidence for the suggestion of important changes between 9 and 10 months. Whereas 9-month-olds showed evidence of memory over a delay of 1 month, 10-month-olds showed evidence of memory over delays of both 1 and 3 months. Experiment 4 provided suggestive evidence that 3 months is not the limit of 10-month-olds' long-term recall: Infants first exposed to and reexposed to event sequences at 10 months showed evidence of memory for aspects of them fully 6 months later.
Together, the results of the present experiments suggest that important developments are occurring during the second half of the 1 st year of life. The functional significance of the developments is that infants who are 10 months of age are able to recall specific past events over periods substantially longer than those tolerated by infants only 1 month younger. This finding is consistent with the argument that in this time frame, the cortico-limbicdiencephalic circuit underlying long-term explicit memory in adults is, in infants, coalescing.
One alternative explanation for the findings of age differences is that the infants exposed to test events at the older ages were more competent imitators than the infants exposed to test events at the younger ages. With respect to the comparison of the performance of the 9-month-olds in Carver and Bauer (1999) and the 10-montholds in the present Experiments 1 and 4, this explanation cannot be supported: The infants in Experiments 1 and 4 were a subset of those included in Carver and Bauer; the infants included in the subset were representative of those in the full sample. Infants in Experiments 1 and 4 recalled events over 3-and 6-month delays regardless of whether they had recalled events in the previous study or not. Thus, the individual differences apparent in that study were no longer evident in the present study.
Neither can an explanation of uncontrolled group differences account for the different patterns observed among the 9-montholds in Experiment 2 and the 10-month-olds in Experiment 3. When the infants in each experiment were 10 months of age, they were tested for immediate recall of the same two 2-step event sequences. Although both groups of infants performed more individual target actions and more pairs of actions in the target order after exposure to the modeled sequences than they had at baseline, the infants in Experiment 2 outperformed the infants in Experiment 3, as measured by both dependent measures. If anything, then, the infants in Experiment 2 should have had an advantage over the infants in Experiment 3. Given the better performance of the infants in Experiment 3 on the primary task (i.e., long-term memory), it is likely that the superior performance of the infants in Experiment 2 was not due to superior mnemonic abilities. We attribute it instead to the infants' differential experience with the imitation task. Consider that for the infants in Experiment 2, the immediate recall data were obtained in the same session in which the infants were tested for 1-month delayed recall of the events to which they had been exposed as 9-month-olds. Thus, the infants had been producing events throughout the session. In contrast, the infants in Experiment 3 had not had any previous opportunities to imitate. The infants in Experiment 2 thus were more familiar with the procedure and may have understood "the point" more than did the infants in Experiment 3. If this is an accurate interpretation, then this finding is interesting in its own right. It suggests that in only a few trials, young infants either form something akin to a "script" for what happens in an imitation task or quickly adopt a "learning to learn" set.
It is interesting that the lack of evidence of recall after 3 months by the 9-month-olds in Experiment 2 did not obtain as a result of failure to produce correct responses to old events or because the infants imitated a smaller proportion of old events, relative to the infants in Experiment 3. Inspection of the mean correct responses for infants after the 3-month delay in Experiment 2 (see Figure 3) suggests that infants did produce actions and pairs of actions for the old events but that they also produced them for new events. Thus, infants' overall activity levels and problem-solving abilities seemed to improve, yet their abilities to recall old events did not increase proportionally. It is not clear why this occurred. It may be that, by random occurrence, the infants in Experiment 2 were better "problem solvers" than infants in Experiment 3. It may also be that the lasting representations from the old events suppressed exploratory behavior for the infants in Experiment 3. That is, it may be the case that infants in Experiment 3 had a greater understanding that the new events were, in fact, new and that they did not know what to do with the toys. If true, infants in Experiment 3 may have been less willing to experiment with the toys, because they understood the point of the game as being "do the thing you saw before" and were aware that the new events were not seen before. Infants in Experiment 2 may have been more willing to explore overall because they did not distinguish between events that they had seen before and new events with respect to whether they "should" know what to do with them. This possibility cannot be addressed with the present data. However, future studies should explore the possibility of suppression of performance on new events by older children. One way of exploring this question is to test a naive group of children at each age, who would not have expectations about the point of the game. Regardless of the reason for increased production of new events by the group of infants in Experiment 2, the inability of the infants to achieve significantly better performance on old than on new events suggests that the infants forgot information at rates in excess of their improved problem-solving ability. Whatever the explanation, it is the difference between production of old and new events that differentiates infants in Experiment 2 from Experiment 3, and it is this difference that reflects the developments in long-term explicit memory that are of interest here.
There are a number of factors that may influence infants' abilities to recall information over time. Bauer et al. (in press ) tested infants' long-term memory performance, varying the number of exposures to events and the presence or absence of reminders during the delay interval. Consistent with previous research (e.g., Carver & Bauer, 1999) , about 45% of 9-month-old infants who viewed events on 3 different exposure days, and who received a reminder of the events during the delay interval, were able to imitate the events after a delay of 1 month. In contrast, among infants who received fewer exposures to the events, or who did not receive reminders during the delay intervals, a much smaller percentage were able to imitate the events. These results suggest that memory in 9-month-old infants is exceptionally fragile and that there is significant room for further developments. In 11-month-olds, memory is more robust and reliable . Eleven-month-olds were able to recall arbitrarily ordered events over very short delays and showed robust memory for events with enabling relations when retested after a delay of 3 months. These results suggest that, with development, infants' memory abilities became increasingly reliable. Results from older children (e.g., Bauer, Wenner, et al., 2000) suggest that developments continue beyond the 1st year of life.
There are, of course, several reasons why infants' performance may improve with age. One possibility is that tasks may involve motor skills that may not be available to infants early in the 1st year of life. A number of studies have included components that address this issue. For example, in Carver and Bauer (1999) , after the delayed-recall period in which 9-month-olds were given the opportunity to show what they remembered, the target event sequences were remodeled and the infant was given another chance to imitate (i.e., relearning was measured). Even infants who were unable to imitate after the long delay were, after exposure to the modeled event sequences, able to enact the actions required to produce the events. Thus, the infants had the motor abilities to imitate the actions but needed to be reminded of the actions to produce. In future research, it will be important to further untangle motor development from memory development. One way this can be done is through the use of direct physiological measures of memory, such as event related potentials (ERPs; e.g., . Such measures are advantageous because they can be used noninvasively with infants throughout the span of the 1st year of life. They thus have the potential to identify memory ability in infants across the time of supposed transition. In addition, methods such as ERP can be used in conjunction with behavioral methods to provide converging evidence of memory performance.
Because the subject of the present research was developments in long-term recall ability, we focused our literature review on studies that most directly informed the suggested course of change. Critically, the comparative and behavioral literatures contain converging evidence of important milestones in mnemonic development around 8 to 12 months of age (Schacter & Moscovitch, 1984) . For example, at the young end of the target age period are changes in recognition memory, apparent at 8 months of age. Virtually from birth, infants show differential looking behavior to familiar and novel stimuli (Pascalis & De Schoen, 1994) . However, it is not clear whether this preferential looking is due to memory or may rather be an obligatory response (Nelson, 1995) . Suggestive of the latter, physiological data indicate that early novelty responses may be related to the frequency of the appearance of old versus new events, rather than their familiarity. Collins (1991, 1992) measured ERPs in response to images that were familiar and presented either frequently (60% of the time) or infrequently (20% of the time) or that were novel (trial unique stimuli presented for the remaining 20% of trials). At 4 months of age, infants' brain activity did not differentiate these three categories of images. At 6 months of age, infants' brain activity differentiated frequently from infrequently occurring stimuli as well as familiar from novel stimuli. At 8 months, brain activity differentiated familiar from novel stimuli regardless of the frequency of presentation. The suggestion advanced by Nelson (1995) is that 8-month-olds' responses are indicative of explicit memory whereas those of the younger infants are more indicative of implicit memory and an obligatory response.
At the old end of the target age period are changes in infants' responses on the delayed nonmatching to sample (DNMS) task. In brief, in the DNMS task, infants are shown a sample stimulus. After a delay, they are shown two objects and must remove the one that is different from the sample in order to receive a reward. Until about 18-20 months of age, infants do quite poorly on this task (Overman, 1990) . The number of trials required to reach criterion performance (i.e., 90% correct choices with no delay imposed), the number of errors, and developmental improvements in performance parallel those seen in monkey infants (Overman, Bachevalier, Turner, & Peuster, 1992) . In the monkey, the ability to reach criterion performance occurs at about 3 months of age. In the human infant, the ability to reach criterion first occurs at about 12-15 months. A much longer period of time is required before infants reach levels of performance seen in adults on the task (Overman, 1990) . However, as has been pointed out by Diamond (1990) , adultlike performance on the DNMS is thought to involve skills such as associating an object with a reward. These skills and the brain areas on which they rely are likely to develop later than the memory component of the DNMS. In studies in which the task demands are changed such that only memory is being measured, infants perform well on the DNMS by 9 months of age (Diamond, Churchland, Cruess, & Kirkham, 1999) .
Changes in recognition memory and DNMS performance are not the only examples that could be cited. In the latter part of the 1st year of life infants increasingly are able to perform tasks that require working memory and representational abilities (see Mandler, 1998 , for a review). The developmental changes we have described in long-term memory likely share some neuropsychological underpinnings with emergent working memory, rule learning, and representational abilities. For example, in the Piagetian A not B task, in the last months of the 1st year of life, infants evidence increasing ability to use recalled representations to guide actions and find hidden objects (e.g., Diamond, 1985) . This task is thought to rely on the integrity of both the medial temporal lobe structures and frontal-cortical components of the memory system (Diamond, 1990) . Whereas together these data suggest that the system involved in representation and explicit memory begins to coalesce during the second half of the 1 st year of life, it is clear that the development of this system is protracted and that developmental changes continue over the next several months and years (see Bauer & Van Abbema, in press , for a review). In DNMS, for example, not only must infants remember which items they saw previously but they also must learn a rule associating the reward with the nonmatching stimulus and must apply that rule. This skill, thought to rely on the development of the orbital-frontal portion of the limbic circuit, does not emerge until several months after the long-term memory that we have described here (Overman, 1990) .
Such flexible understanding of rules, consequences, and antecedents also is likely to affect other aspects of infant functioning. In addition to memory, connections between medial temporal and frontal aspects of the limbic system are also involved in emotion perception and regulation (Bachevalier, 1992) . Recently, it has been proposed that prefrontal cortex is critically involved in attentional aspects of social cognition (Dawson, Carver, & McPartland, 2000) . Near the end of the 1 st year of life, infants form an enduring relationship with their primary caregiver that has an important role in their future social and cognitive development (Sroufe, 1996 (Sroufe, , 1997 . Infants also begin to use social-cognitive strategies such as social referencing and joint attention in their interactions with others late in the 1st year of life (Tomasello, 1999) . Developing connections between medial temporal structures involved in emotion perception (such as the amygdala) and frontal areas involved in regulation of behavior, as well as the circuits involved in long-term memory ability, may be critical for these developmental advances. As infants become increasingly able to encode and retrieve representations of past experiences; as infants develop increasingly sophisticated emotion perception and regulation skills; and as they increasingly learn to predict the behavior of others by forming associations between people, situations, and outcomes, social-cognitive skills become an important part of their behavioral repertoire.
The results of the present experiments support the idea that as infants develop, they become increasingly able to encode and retrieve representations of events. These results have implications for theories of cognitive neuroscience as well as memory development. Although in the present research we obtained no direct measures of brain development, the results suggest that the behaviors thought to be subserved by the neural system that underlies long-term explicit memory emerge at the end of the 1st year. Further, the findings in the present study suggest that, although long-term explicit memory is a continuously emergent process, there are ages at which functional discontinuities can be seen. Future research should further explore changes in memory ability with development. Technologies that allow the direct measure of neural development such as ERPs should be used in longitudinal research to confirm that the developmental changes observed in behavior are driven by corresponding changes in brain development.
